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Inter- and Intra-Marriage Premiums Revisited: 
It’s Probably Who You Are, Not Who You Marry!
* 
 
For immigrants, intermarriage with natives is assumed to have an assimilating role due to the 
enhancement of local human capital such a union creates in the form of improved knowledge 
about host country institutions, language and customs as well as access to native spouses’ 
networks and contacts. However, marriage choice is endogenous, unobserved factors 
influence who we marry and our labor market outcomes. This study uses panel data on 
immigrants and their spouses in Sweden to estimate marriage premiums taking into account 
individual heterogeneity. This is done for three types of marriages; intermarriage to natives 
and intra-marriage with immigrants from home countries or other (non-Swedish) countries. A 
staggered fixed effects model is estimated separately for each marriage type to further 
disentangle a causal effect of intermarriage (intra-marriage) on annual income from any 
remaining positive selection effects into respective marriage type. Results from fixed effects 
estimation indicate that all types of marriage (with one exception) yield positive marriage 
premiums of similar magnitude. Significant pre-marriage income growth and a lack of post-
marriage income growth for those that marry natives suggest that intermarriage premiums 
are largely due to selection. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of recent studies suggest that immigrant intermarriage with natives yields a positive 
causal effect on labor market outcomes such as income and employment (Meng and Gregory, 
2005; Çelikaksoy, 2007; Meng and Meurs, 2009; Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2009, 2010, 
Gevrek, 2009).
1 Intermarriage with natives is assumed to have an assimilating role due to the 
enhancement of local human capital such a union creates in the form of improved knowledge 
about host country institutions, language and customs as well as access to native spouses’ 
networks and contacts. The main problem with identifying a causal effect of intermarriage is 
that marriage choice is likely to be endogenous, unobserved factors influence both who we 
marry and labor market outcomes. This begs the question of whether it is possible to separate 
the effect of being assimilated in the labor market and subsequently intermarrying with 
natives from intermarrying with natives and becoming assimilated. The previous literature on 
intermarriage premiums is almost uniformly based on cross-section data, using instrumental 
variable methods to identify causal effects.
2 In this study, panel data is used to assess 
intermarriage premiums for immigrants controlling for unobserved individual specific effects. 
Panel data also allows an analysis of income growth before and after marriage which can help 
to disentangle a causal effect of intermarriage on annual income from positive selection 
effects into intermarriage.  
 
  Focusing on the income effects of intermarriage, Meng and Gregory (2005), using OLS 
estimation on data from Australia, find that male immigrants intermarried to natives have 14.7 
percent higher earnings than their single counterparts while male immigrants intra-married to 
other immigrants have 9.9 percent higher incomes. In other words, they find a 4.8 percentage 
                                                 
1 Kantarevic (2004), however, finds no causal effect of intermarriage on earnings for the U.S. There is also a 
literature on the effects of intermarriage on children, see for example van Ours and Veenman (2008) and Furtado 
(2009). 
2 A recent exception is Nottmeyer (2010) who uses panel data to study intermarriage premiums in Germany. 3 
 
point relative intermarriage premium. For female immigrants the corresponding relative 
intermarriage premium was found to be 9.8 percentage points. Meng and Meurs (2009) find 
similar results for immigrants in France; immigrants that intermarry with natives earn 6 
percent more than immigrants that intra-marry with other immigrants. The intermarriage 
premium increases considerably in both studies when the endogeneity of marriage choice is 
taken into account via instrument variable (IV) methods. Gevrek (2009) finds that 
intermarriage with a native is associated with a wage premium of 7 percent using Dutch data 
and IV estimation.
3  These studies rely on two types of instruments; group size and sex ratios. 
Group size is defined as the size of the population (opposite sex) with similar characteristics, 




An alternative strategy is to use panel data methods in order to eliminate individual (time 
invariant) unobserved heterogeneity. If marriage choice is as good as randomly assigned 
conditional on unobserved characteristics as well as (included in estimation) observable 
characteristics, a causal effect of intermarriage can be estimated. Nottmeyer (2010) estimates 
intermarriage premiums using panel data methods for Germany and finds no relative 
intermarriage premium. In other words, marriage premiums associated with marrying natives 
are found to be of similar magnitude to marriage premiums associated with marrying other 
immigrants. However, if important omitted variable are not time-invariant, than fixed effects 
estimation may not be enough to determine a causal effect of intermarriage on earnings. In 
                                                 
3 Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2009, 2010) focus instead on employment effects using US data and find that 
marriage with a native increases employment probabilities. 
4  There is a recent literature showing a causal effect of ethnic enclaves, measured as the size of the ethnic group, 
on labor market outcomes (Bertrand, et al., 2000;Damm, 2009;  Edin, et al., 2003; Grönqvist, 2006; Åslund and 




such a case, selection into intermarriage on time varying unobservable characteristics may 
still bias fixed effects estimates of intermarriage premiums.  
 
In order to get closer to determining a causal effect of intermarriage, the timing of marriage 
can instead be used in separate estimations by marriage type (intermarriage with natives/intra-
marriage with other immigrants). This setup implies that immigrants who intermarry in one 
year are compared to immigrants that do not intermarry that year but who do so at another 
point in the observation period (and likewise for those that intra-marry). Separate estimation 
by marriage type diminishes difficult sample selection effects. This so-called staggered 
treatment approach where treatment is defined as a change in civil status during a specific 
year, allows for an analysis of pre- and post treatment effects on income. If intermarriage 
alone, i.e., the change in civil status, has a causal effect on earnings, there should be no or 
smaller effects of intermarriage in the years prior to the actual year of marriage.  
 
Although a change in civil status is an observable event, a causal effect of interacting with a 
native partner using the timing of marriage may nonetheless be difficult to identify, as the 
presumed mechanisms through which immigrants are thought to gain from intermarriage may 
benefit the individual before the actual year of marriage, i.e., during the courting stage or via a 
period of cohabitation. Immigrants may improve their host country language skills, enhance 
their knowledge of local institutions and benefit from the networks of native partners prior to 
the actual year of intermarriage. As such, the existence of pre-treatment effects on income 
does not alone refute a causal effect of interacting closely with natives on earnings. On the 
other hand, some benefits are likely to accrue to immigrants only after the actual date of 
marriage. Female immigrants for example may benefit from a change of surnames from 5 
 
foreign- to Swedish-sounding via intermarriage to natives.
5 A lack of post-treatment effects 
would likewise suggest that it is not intermarriage per se that has an effect on income as one 
can safely assume that the benefits of intermarriage should accumulate and grow during the 
years close after marriage. A comparison of income growth around the year of marriage 
between marriage types can also shed some light on whether marriage to natives differs from 
marriage to other immigrants once selection into these marriage types is taken into account. 
As such, estimating and comparing the dynamics of a change in marital status on income can 
help us assess the plausibility that intermarriage has a causal impact on earnings and is not 
due to positive selection into this form of marriage.  
 
In this study, marriage premiums are analyzed using panel data for the years 1998-2005. The 
sample used in estimation consists of four subsets of immigrants to Sweden, based on age at 
immigration and gender, who have a first registered change in civil status from single to 
married during the observation period. Three marriage types are defined for immigrants, intra-
marriage to spouses from the same country of origin, intra-marriage to spouses from other 
(non-Swedish) countries of origin and intermarriage to natives.  Results from fixed effects 
estimation indicate positive marriage premiums for those that intra-marry with spouses from 
origin countries as well as those that intermarry with natives. Intra-marriage premiums 
associated with marriage to spouses from home countries are found to be of similar or 
significantly larger magnitude than premiums associated with intermarriage to natives. 
Results from staggered fixed effects estimation show that in comparison to those that have 
four or more years to marriage, income grows significantly prior to the year of marriage 
within each marriage type, indicating that a change in marital status per se does not have a 
                                                 
5 See Arai and Skogman Thoursie (2009) for the causal effect of surname change (from foreign sounding to 
native sounding) on annual income.   6 
 
causal impact on earnings. A lack of post-marriage income growth for those that intermarry 
with natives further puts into question a causal impact of intermarriage on income.  
 
2. Data and Empirical Setup 
2.1 Data 
The data used in estimation stems from registered information at Statistics Sweden (SCB) on 
the entire foreign born population, 16-65 years of age, residing in Sweden during any of the 
years from 1998 to 2005. Included in the data is detailed individual information on personal 
and demographic characteristics, education, employment and income.
6 Due to partner 
identification numbers, all individuals are linked to their partners if a partnership is registered 
during the year in question. Partnership is defined as marriage or cohabitation in a household 
with common children.
7 As such, we have detailed information not only on the main 
individual but also on partners provided that partners fall under the given age restrictions.
8  In 
addition, information on the full history of changes in civil status for all individuals in the 
sample is available including dates of civil status change.  
 
The original sample of foreign born is broken down, by gender, into two sub-samples based 
on age at migration; immigration prior to the age of 16 and immigration between the ages of 
16 and 45. This delineation is imposed in order to compare and contrast intermarriage rates 
and intermarriage premiums for immigrants that arrived young with those that arrived at 
older, but still marriageable ages.
9 Three factors are generally thought to influence 
intermarriage rates: individual preferences, marriage market characteristics and third party 
                                                 
6 The data (Statistics on Immigrants - STATIV) was initially created by the Swedish Integration Board. 
7 Data on partnerships stems from information on households. To date, Statistics Sweden tracks only married 
couples, couples in same-sex registered partnerships and cohabitants with children in common.  
8 Due to the age restrictions of the data, information on partners above the age of 65 is not available. It is 
possible to identify the civil status of those with older spouses due to registered information on civil status but no 
information on spousal characteristics is available. 
9 Only slightly more than 800 observations are lost due to the upper age at migration cut off (45).  7 
 
involvement (Angrist, 2002; Becker, 1974; Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Blau et al., 1982; 
Chiswick and Houseworth, 2008; Furtado, 2006; Jasso et al., 2000; Kalmijn, 1998; Kalmijn 
and Van Tubergen, 2006; Lievens, 1998, 1999; Schoen, 1983; Qian et al., 2001). Those who 
immigrated at a younger age may differ on all three dimensions due to assimilation effects 
associated with an early age at immigration (Böhlmark, 2008; Cahan et al., 2001; Cortes, 
2006; Bonzalez, 2001; Schaafsma and Sweetman, 2001; van Ouers and Veenman, 2006). A 
younger age at migration may therefore imply greater access to native marriage and labor 
markets in comparison to those that arrived at older ages. In addition, those that arrive prior to 
the age of 16 are less likely to be tied movers or marriage migrants.
10  
 
The sample is restricted further to those aged 18 or over with a first change in civil status, 
from single to married, between 1999 and 2005 in order to have at least one observation on 
income prior to any change in civil status. As information on de facto marriages 
(cohabitation) is available only for those living in the same household with children in 
common, it is not possible to observe couples in de facto marriages before they have 
children.
11 Couples in de facto marriages that never formally marry are therefore dropped 
from observation.
12 After these restrictions, the sample used in estimation consists of 360,516 
observations on foreign born individuals with a first change in civil status from single to 
married between the years 1999-2005.
13  
 
                                                 
10 Tied-movers are defined as immigrants that arrive in the host country to join earlier immigrated partners while 
marriage migrants are immigrants that immigrate for the primary purpose of marrying host country residents 
(native or immigrant).    
11 Statistics Sweden does not record information on cohabitants without children in common.  
12 Approximately 28 percent of the original sample is in de facto marriages (33 percent in the younger age at 
migration sub-sample and 25 percent in the older sub-sample).    
13 Note that a small proportion, 4.9 % of those that eventually marry, indicate being in a de facto marriage with 
children prior to the formal change of civil status from single to married. For these individuals, year of marriage 
is defined by the observed year of a change in status from single to cohabitating. As a check of robustness, these 
individuals are also dropped from estimation with no change in results.   
 8 
 
Three types of marriages are defined for immigrants based on spouse’s country of birth.   
Intra-marriage (National) is defined as a marriage to a foreign born person from the same 
country of origin. Intra-marriage (other Foreign Born) is defined as a marriage to a foreign 
born person from a different (non-Swedish) country of origin. Finally, intermarriage is 
defined as a marriage to a native born person.  
 
Of those that marry, 47 percent of female immigrants and 33 percent of male immigrants 
intermarry with natives.
14 This varies by age at migration, most notably in the older age at 
migration subsample where 47 percent of female immigrants but only 26 percent of male 
immigrants intermarry with natives. Of those that marry another foreign born spouse, 63-68 
percent (female and male immigrants respectively) intra-marry with a person from the same 
country of origin. See Table 1 for intermarriage rates by region of origin.  
 
Table 1: Intermarriage Rates, by Region of Origin  









Nordic  80.9 76.6 63.4 51.4 
West  Europe  74.3 69.0 67.1 70.5 











South  America 58.0 60.1 61.2 33.4 
Asia/Middle  East  42.7 32.6 41.5  9.1 
African  33.2 27.8 24.9 19.9 
Oceania  78.3 84.8 87.6 85.0 
      
 
The highest intermarriage rates are found among Nordic, West European and North/Central 
American immigrants as well as immigrants from Oceania and the lowest among East 
European, African and Asian immigrants. There are notable gender differences in 
                                                 
14 23 percent of native born spouses are observed to have immigrant backgrounds, that is to at least one parent is 
foreign born. No delineation by so-called second generation status is done in this paper.  9 
 
intermarriage rates in the older age at migration sub-sample. Male immigrants from East 
Europe, South America, Asia and Africa indicate considerably lower intermarriage rates than 
their female counterparts. See also Table A1 in Appendix for intermarriage rates by country 
of origin for eight of the largest immigrant groups in Sweden.  
 
2.2 Empirical Setup 
For comparative purposes, pooled OLS estimation of the following general income equation 
is first estimated:  
it t it it it it it X M M M income            
'
3 3 2 2 1 1 ) ln(         (1) 
where log income is the log of annual work earnings for individual i during year t.
15 The main 
variables of interest M1, M2 and M3 denote marriage to another foreign-born person from the 
same country of origin (intra-marriage: National), marriage to a foreign born person from 
another (non-Swedish) country of origin (intra-marriage: other Foreign Born) or marriage to a 
native born person (intermarriage) respectively. The reference group for M1, M2 and M3 are 
those that are registered as single during the year in question. Note that the sample used in 
estimation is restricted to those that marry at some point during the observation period, 
reducing potential differences in income due to unobservable differences between those that 
never marry and those that eventually marry. Xit is a vector of variables indicating both 
human capital and demographic variables such as age, education, region of origin, duration of 
residence and the presence of small children in the household. As data is pooled for the years 
1998-2005, a full set of year dummies, t, are controlled for in estimation. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level in all estimations in order to account for individual serial 
correlation over time and any unknown form of heteroscedasticity.   
 
                                                 
15 See Table A2 in Appendix for a description of variables used in estimation. 10 
 
If marriage choice is exogenously determined, estimation of equation (1) will yield causal 
estimates of intra- and intermarriage premiums on earnings. This is not likely to be the case; 
unobserved factors are likely to be correlated with respective type of marriage choice and 
earnings. The literature on positive assortative mating suggests that partnership formation is 
more likely to take place among individuals with similar characteristics in terms of for 
example, education, income, socioeconomic background, ethnicity, religion and religiosity as 
well as height, weight and IQ (Chiswick and Houseworth, 2008; Epstein and Guttman, 1984; 
Furtado, 2006; Lichter and Qian, 2001; Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Mare, 1991; Meng and 
Gregory, 2005, Sandefur and McKinnel, 1986; Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989; Pencavel, 
1998; McPherson et al., 2001). These observed patterns of assortative mating suggest a 
correlation between marriage types and unobserved attributes such as language proficiency, 
motivation, social skills, ability and so forth. If marriage type is as good as randomly assigned 
conditional on unobserved time invariant attributes (such as social skills and ability) and other 
observed covariates, then a fixed effects model will yield causal estimates of marriage 
premiums. Fixed effects estimation of marriage premiums are therefore estimated based on 
the following general model:  
 
it i t it it it it it X M M M income              
'
3 3 2 2 1 1 ) ln(      (2) 
 
The fixed effects model includes a full set of controls for individual effects, i, to account for 
individual heterogeneity and as earlier, a full set of year dummies (t) to account for changes 
in earnings over time common to all individuals. 1, 2 and 3  measure the effect on earnings 
of a change in civil status from single to intra- or intermarried respectively. If cross-section 
estimates of marriage premiums are found to be higher than fixed effects estimates, this 
suggests a positive selection bias on cross-section estimates. Lower fixed effects estimates of 11 
 
marriage premiums may also in part be the result of accentuated measurement error in this 
type of estimation. This is especially the case when the status of interest is persistent over 
time and variation may be driven by errors in classification.  Here, focus is explicitly on 
individuals who have a first change in marital status during the observation period, as such 
there is considerable variation in marital status. The data is also corrected for subsequent 
divorce, and marriage dates are corroborated with information on both civil status changes 
and partner information. Hence, the observed changes in marital status are unlikely to be 
driven primarily by noise as the scope for measurement error bias in estimation is small.   
 
That the most important omitted variables are time-invariant may not, however, be true for 
this sample of relatively young immigrants entering into first marriages. Host language 
proficiency for example is likely to change over time and is important for both marriage 
choice and labor market outcomes. To further assess the existence of a causal effect of 
intermarriage on earnings, a staggered treatment approach, using the timing of marriage, is 
estimated separately for each marriage type.
16 Estimation of the above models (equation 1 and 
2) is based on individual marriage status in each year: single, intra-married or intermarried. 
The staggered treatment approach instead focuses exclusively on the year of marriage 
comparing the earnings of individuals that intermarry (intra-marry) in year t with those that do 
not intermarry (intra-marry) this year. This method diminishes sample selection issues under 
the assumption that time varying unobservable characteristics are relatively more similar 
within respective marriage type than across marriage types, especially with regards to 
characteristics of relevance for income. In other words, individuals that intermarry are 
presumed to be more alike in unobserved characteristics than those that intra-marry. 
  
                                                 
16 The staggered treatment approach has been used in a number of earlier studies on different issues. See for 
example Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) and Arai and Skogman Thoursie 
(2009). 12 
 
This estimation strategy also allows for an assessment of pre- and post-marriage earnings 
growth which can indicate to what degree intermarriage (intra-marriage) premiums arise prior 
to the actual year of marriage. If changes in civil status alone have an effect on earnings, there 
should be no or small effects of marriage (either type) on earnings prior to the actual year of 
marriage. As a majority of those that marry interact with partners prior to the actual year of 
marriage, this method cannot rule out a causal effect of partnerships on income. Nonetheless, 
an effect of marriage on earnings in the years prior to the actual year of marriage suggests that 
those that are planning to intermarry (intra-marry) in the near future are on different income 
trajectories than those that have many years left to marriage. Following the model proposed 
by Arai and Skogman Thoursie (2009), the following equation is estimated separately for 








3 , 3 , ) log(
q
it i t it t i t q t i q t it X iage YearOfMarr iage YearOfMarr income        
       ( 3 )  
YearOfMarriage denotes the year t in which the individual i intermarries with a native 
(alternatively intra-marries). Leads and lags of the year of marriage variable are dummy 
variables denoting whether or not intermarriage (intra-marriage) occurred in year t+q. The 
length of the panel data available allows for three leads where marriage occurs 1-3 years after 
the year t and two lags where marriage occurs 1-2 years before the year t.
 17 The variable 
YearOfMarriaget-3+ is a dummy variable equal to one if the year of marriage occurred 3 or 
more years prior to the year t. This setup implies that there is a well-defined reference period 
covering four or more years prior to the actual year of marriage. All estimates of leads and 
lags of year of marriage are relative to this early reference period. For example, the coefficient 
                                                 
17 As a change of marital status occurs during the years 1999-2005, an increase in the number of leads and lags 
implies that there are fewer and fewer individuals left to identify the effect of intermarriage. The trade off with 
using a lower number of leads is that there are fewer years to assess income trajectories prior to the actual year of 
intermarriage.  13 
 
for year t+3 indicates the effect on earnings three years prior to intermarriage (intra-marriage) 
in comparison to those that have four or more years left to intermarriage (intra-marriage). 
Likewise, t-1 measures the effect on earnings one year after intermarriage (intra-marriage) in 
comparison to those that have four or more years left to intermarriage (intra-marriage). Note 
that the staggered treatment approach includes a full set of controls for individual effects, i, 
to control for the influence of time invariant unobservable characteristics on income. 
 
Descriptive statistics by gender and marriage type are presented in Table 2. It is immediately 
clear that those that intermarry with natives differ from those that intra-marry with other 
immigrants (both types). Both pre- and post-marriage earnings as well as average employment 
rates are higher among those that intermarry in comparison with the two intra-marriage types. 
Average earnings and employment for those that intra-marry with spouses from other (non-
Swedish) countries of origin born tend to lie between averages for those that intra-marry with 
spouses from home countries and those that intermarry with natives. Immigrants that 
intermarry with natives are somewhat older, have a longer duration of residence on average 
(as noted by year of immigration) and have considerably larger proportions with tertiary 
educations that those that intra-marry (especially among female immigrants). Finally, those 
that intermarry with natives are more likely to stem from Nordic and West European countries 
and less likely to stem from East European, Asian (especially male immigrants) and African 
countries.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, by Gender and Type of Marriage (Age at Migration: 0-45). 



















636 804  1309 1014  1240 1758 
Post-Marriage  
Earnings  
1039 1164  1571  1600 1799  2384 





51.5  55.5 68.7 64.7  68.9 78.9 
Pre-Marriage Small 
Child 
7.07  6.8 3.2 1.2  1.0 0.4 
Post-Marriage 
Small Child 
49.4  49.7 52.5 46.6  45.4 54.8 
Year of Birth  1975  1975  1972  1971  1970  1970 
Year of 
Immigration  
1993 1991  1988  1992 1990  1987 
Age  at  Marriage  26.2  27.4 30.1 30.9  32.1 31.7 
Highest Level of Education (2005):   
  Short Compulsory  7.0  4.6 4.3 9.0 6.9  2.4
    Compulsory   12.8  13.3 6.4 13.6  13.2 9.7 
  Secondary  46.1  43.8  32.1  44.0  45.0  39.7 
  Short Tertiary  5.3  7.0 6.2 4.5 5.4  6.9
    Tertiary  23.6  26.8 47.4 24.0  24.1 35.1 
  PhD  1.1  1.6  2.2  2.2  2.5  3.5 
  Unknown  4.1  2.9  1.5  2.8  3.0  2.7 
Region of Origin:          
  Nordic  7.8  10.5  25.9  5.4  10.3  27.8 
  West Europe  2.5  5.7  9.8  1.6  8.8  19.9 
  East Europe  32.2  31.7  14.7  27.1  25.0  13.2 
  North/Central      
America 
0.5  2.1 4.0 0.4  2.2 5.0 
  South America  4.7  8.4  9.2  2.7  5.5  7.3 
  Asia  44.7  35.1  32.6  54.0  39.7  20.5 
  Africa  7.6  6.3  3.0  8.8  8.1  4.4 
  Oceania  0.04  0.3  0.7  0.02  0.5  2.0 
# Observations 
(N*T) 
53,994  31,722 81.182 88,810  41,730 63,078 
Note: Earnings are in 100 SEK and 2005 prices. Pre-marriage earnings are averaged over the years prior to 
marriage and post-marriage earnings are an averaged over the years after marriage (including year of marriage).  
 
A comparison of post-marriage individual and spousal characteristics, by age at migration, is 
shown in Tables 3 and 4, for female and male immigrants respectively. It is immediately clear 
that those in the older age at migration sub-sample have a considerably shorter duration of 
residence on average than those in the younger age at migration sub-sample as seen by year of 
immigration. The older age at migration sub-sample is also somewhat older on average.  
 
Spousal gaps in post-marriage income and employment are higher for female immigrants that 
intermarry compared to likewise gaps among those that intra-marry. This is especially 
noticeable for the younger age at migration sub-sample, where female immigrants have higher 
employment rates than their more recently arrived spouses. This is partially a consequence of 
longer duration of residence than spouses but also suggests a greater post-marriage 15 
 
employment attachment than, for example, female immigrants that marry natives. Spousal 
gaps in duration of residence are larger in the younger age at migration sub-sample suggesting 
that couples in the older age at migration sub-sample are to a larger degree tied-movers. 
Indeed, 21 percent of female immigrants in the older age at migration sub-sample have 
spouses that arrived in the host country within two years of their own year of immigration (39 
percent among those that intra-marry with spouses from the same country of origin) compared 
to 9 percent in the younger sub-sample. 
 
Table 3: Post Marriage Individual and Spousal Characteristics, Female Immigrants 

















Main Respondent:   
Earnings    1008 1142  1699  1063 1186  1450 
Employment 53.9  57.3 75.4 49.6  53.8 62.4 
Year of Birth  1979  1978  1973  1974  1973  1971 
Year of 
Immigration 
1990 1986  1978  1996 1996  1997 
    


















































24,453 16,788  42,557  29,541 14,934  38,625 
 
 
For male immigrants (Table 4), spousal income and employment gaps are, contrary to female 
immigrants, largest for those that intra-marry (either form) in comparison to those that 
intermarry. These differences in spousal gaps suggest different selection mechanisms into 
different forms of marriage by gender and age at migration. It also suggests that there may be 
differences in the labor market attachment of especially female immigrants depending on if 16 
 
they are bringing spouses from abroad after a longer period of time in the host country or are 
migrating to marry immigrants in Sweden.
18 
 
Table 4: Post Marriage Individual and Spousal Characteristics, Male Immigrants 

















Main Respondent:           
Earnings    1570 1883  2486  1607 1761  2290 
Employment 68.7  73.1 83.3 63.6  66.9 74.9 
Year of Birth  1976  1973  1971  1970  1969  1970 
Year of 
Immigration 
1987 1982  1977  1994 1994  1996 
          


















































20,639 14,318  32,209  68,171 27,412  30,869 
 
 
3. Results: Marriage Premiums 
3.1 OLS and Fixed Effects Estimation of Marriage Premiums on Income 
Results of pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation of marriage premiums are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6, for female and male immigrants respectively. Three models are estimated; 
OLS estimation of unadjusted marriage premiums (adjusted only for common time effects), 
OLS estimation of marriage premiums including controls for age, education, region of origin, 
duration of residence and the presence of small children in the household, and fixed effects 
estimation (including controls) of marriage premiums. 
 
Table 5: Marriage Premiums on Earnings, Female Immigrants 
  Age at Migration < 16  Age at Migration 16 - 45 
  OLS  OLS FE OLS  OLS FE 
Marriage Type (reference: single)   
                                                 
18 Note that varying spousal selection by gender and age-at-migration implies that there is relatively little double 
















        
Intra-marriage 




























        
Controls  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations 70,258 70,258 70,258 61,878 61,878 61,878 
R-squared  0.06 0.26 0.57 0.02 0.22 0.59 
Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: All estimations include a full set of controls for year (1998-
2005).  Other controls are age (5 categories), education (6 categories), duration of residence (quadratic), a 
dummy for the presence of small children in the household and region of origin (8 categories). ** denotes 




Unadjusted premiums for intermarriage to natives are huge (Column 1). Female immigrants 
that intermarry with natives are associated with 40 percent higher earnings than single female 
immigrants (younger age at migration sub-sample) while female immigrant that intra-marry 
with a foreign born man from the same country of origin are associated with lower earnings 
than their single counterparts (15 percent lower). Female immigrants in the older age at 
migration subsample indicate a smaller intermarriage premium of 9 percent. For male 
immigrants intermarriage to natives is associated with 36-47 percent higher earnings, 
depending on sub-sample, while intra-marriage to a female immigrant from the same country 
of origin is associated with no or small marriage premiums (6 % in the older age at migration 
sub-sample). 
 
Much of this difference is explained by selection into respective marriage type. Controlling in 
OLS estimation for differences in human capital and demographic characteristics reduces 
premiums associated with intermarriage to natives considerably for both female and male 
immigrants (Column 2). For female immigrants, the relative intermarriage premium (relative 18 
 
to immigrants that marry spouses from the same country of origin) is reduced to 3.2 
percentage points for the younger age at migration sub-sample and to 6.2 for the older age at 
migration sub-sample. Notice that intra-marriage (either type) is no longer associated with a 
marriage penalty.  
 
For male immigrants the premium associated with intermarriage to a native is likewise 
reduced for both sub-samples. For male immigrants intermarriage is associated with 14 
percent higher earnings in the younger age at migration sub-sample and with 9 percent higher 
earnings in the older sub-sample. Premiums associated with intra-marriage to spouses from 
the same country of origin are somewhat larger after controlling for observable 
characteristics. In the younger age at migration sub-sample the relative intermarriage 
premium, relative to intra-marriage with spouses from home countries, is 5.9 percentage 
points. These results are similar to the intermarriage premiums reported in Meng and Gregory 
(2005), Meng and Meurs (2009) and Gevrek (2009) for immigrants in Australia, France and 
Holland respectively.  
 
Table 6: Marriage Premiums on Earnings, Male Immigrants 
  Age at Migration < 16  Age at Migration 16 - 45 
  OLS  OLS FE OLS  OLS FE 
Marriage Type (reference: single)   
Intra-marriage  0.011  0.079**  0.044*  0.063** 0.080** 0.075** 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
        
Intermarriage-




























        
Controls  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations 56,138 56,138 56,138 95,008 95,008 95,008 
R-squared  0.07 0.22 0.58 0.03 0.15 0.56 
Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: All estimations include a full set of controls for year (1998-
2005).  Other controls are age (5 categories), education (6 categories), duration of residence (quadratic), a 19 
 
dummy for the presence of small children in the household and region of origin (8 categories). ** denotes 




Estimation of marriage premiums via fixed effects estimation controlling for individual 
heterogeneity in unobserved time-invariant characteristics yields a very different picture of 
marriage premiums. A change in marital status from single to married with a native 
(intermarriage) continues to yield a significant income premium for both female and male 
immigrants but of smaller magnitude than in OLS estimation. Intra-marriage premiums are 
now found to be of similar or significantly larger magnitudes than intermarriage premiums, 
though no marriage premium is found for male immigrants that marry immigrants from other 
(non-Swedish) countries of origin. Note that female immigrants in the older age at migration 
sub-sample that intra-marry with spouses from home countries indicate an especially large 
intra-marriage premium. These results, similar to those found in Nottmeyer (2010) for 
Germany, suggest a positive selection bias on OLS estimates of intermarriage premiums as 
well as the existence of marriage premiums for both types of marriage (inter- and intra-
marriage) once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account (again, with the exception of 
male immigrants that marry immigrants from other (non-Swedish) countries).
19   
 
There are some peculiarities in results by age at migration. One may have expected larger 
intermarriage premiums for immigrants with a higher age at migration due to the assumption 
of lower social and economic integration in comparison to those with younger ages at 
migration, all else equal, and therefore larger gains from interacting with natives or stronger 
positive selection effects into this type of marriage. This is not generally found to be true as 
                                                 
19 Results for fixed effects estimation separately by region of origin (8 regions) are reported in Tables A3 and A4 
for the younger and older age at migration sub-samples respectively. The large intra-marriage (national) 
premiums for female immigrants in the older age at migration sub-sample appear to be driven by relatively large 
marriage premiums for female immigrants from especially East Europe, but also from West Europe, Asia and 
Africa.    20 
 
intermarriage premiums are similar across sub-samples. Instead, those with an older age at 
migration, especially female immigrants, have higher intra-marriage premiums associated 
with marriage to spouses from home countries than those with a younger age at migration. 
Female immigrants also seem to benefit more from intra-marriage than their male 
counterparts.  
 
These results suggest a higher relative female attachment to the labor market due to family 
investment type mechanisms where female immigrants remain attached to the labor market in 
order to assist their relatively more recently arrived immigrant spouses’ adjustment to the host 
country labor market. This is consistent with the small spousal employment gaps among 
female immigrants that intra-marry shown in Table 3. In the younger age at migration sub-
sample, female immigrants that intermarry with other immigrants have higher employment 
rates, on average, post marriage than their spouses.  
 
3.2  Staggered Fixed Effects Estimation of Marriage Premiums on Income 
In order to analyze the dynamics of earnings growth before and after marriage, a staggered 
treatment approach is used based on variation in year of marriage. These estimations are done 
separately for each type of marriage (intra/inter) in order to further diminish difficult sample 
selection problems due to selection on time-varying unobservable characteristics such as host 
country language proficiency into respective marriage type.  
 
Results for female immigrants are presented in Table 7. A comparison of the leads and lags to 
year of marriage for female immigrants indicates that there are significant increases in 
earnings prior to year of marriage for all three marriage types in comparison to those within 
respective marriage type that have four or more years to marriage. This indicates that a 
change in civil status per se does not have a causal impact on income. However, pre-marriage 21 
 
income growth does not in and of  itself refute that interactions with a spouse-to-be has an 
effect on earnings as most partners meet 1-3 years prior to an actual change in civil status. 
Interestingly, relative earnings growth prior to marriage is largely similar for respective 
marriage type suggesting that female immigrants may have different marriage markets but 
that pre-marriage income growth is similar once selection into respective marriage type is 
accounted for.  
 
Results in Table 7 also show that income growth appears to stabilize at a higher level around 
the year of marriage for those that intra-marry with spouses from home countries (intra-
marriage: national) or tapers off soon after marriage for the other two marriage types. 
Dougherty (2006) finds that marriage premiums for females in general peak about two years 
after marriage and decline thereafter. Results here therefore suggest that females that intra-
marry with men from home countries diverge from this general pattern as post-marriage 
income growth does not decline during the observation period but rather remains at a 
significantly higher level throughout the observation period, in comparison to the reference 
group.  Note that a lack of post-marriage income growth for those that intermarry with natives 
further suggests that intermarriage premiums stem from unobserved selection into this type of 
marriage as one would otherwise expect earnings to continue escalating as immigrants reap 
the benefits of native networks, institutional know-how, language proficiency and so forth. 
 
Table 7: Pre- and Post-Marriage Effects on Earnings, Female Immigrants.  Staggered Fixed 
Effects Estimation Separately by Type of Marriage. 















































1 year before   0.170**  0.179*  0.162**  0.157***  0.143**  0.159*** 22 
 











































3 or more years 



























Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: age (5 categories), education (7 categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). ** denotes significance at 1% level 
and * significance at 5% level. Standard Errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the individual level in all 
estimations. 
 
Staggered fixed effects estimation of marriage premiums for male immigrants indicate similar 
patterns to female immigrants with the exception of intra-marriage to other foreign born 
spouses where no significant changes in income either prior to or after the actual year of 
marriage are noted. Similar to female immigrants, there is significant pre-marriage income 
growth for those that intra-marry with spouses from the same country of origin as well as for 
those that intermarry with natives. Unlike female immigrants, pre-marriage income growth is 
stronger for those that intra-marry in comparison to those that intermarry suggesting that once 
selection is taken into account, intra-marriage to spouses from the same country of origin is 
associated with stronger income growth than intermarriage to natives. This is also seen by the 
continued significantly higher level of income post-marriage for those that intra-marry with 
spouses from home countries.  
 
Table 8: Pre- and Post-Marriage Effects on Earnings, Male Immigrants.  Staggered Fixed 
Effects Estimation Separately by Type of Marriage. 





























































Year  of  0.256**  0.074 0.100*  0.198***  0.034 0.058* 23 
 
marriage (t)  (0.068) (0.085)  (0.047) (0.059)  (0.066) (0.034) 




























3 or more years 



























Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: age (5 categories), education (seven categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). *** significant at 1%, ** significant 




Descriptive statistics on spousal labor market gaps presented in Table 3 and 4 show that 
female immigrants that marry male immigrants, on average, have higher or similar post-
marriage employment rates than their more recently arrived immigrant spouses. This is not 
true for female immigrants that marry male natives where the spousal employment gap is 
negative (native husbands have higher employment rates than their immigrant wives). Similar 
patterns are found for male immigrants where employment gaps to spouses are considerably 
larger for those that marry female immigrants relative to those that marry female natives. 
Mechanisms akin to the so-called family investment hypotheses (Baker and Benjamin, 1997; 
Duleep and Sanders, 1993) may be at work where spouses with higher duration of residence, 
regardless of gender, maintain a higher relative attachment to the labor market in order to 
assist the labor market transition of more recently-arrived spouses. 
 
3.1 Fixed Effects Estimation of Marriage Premiums on Employment 
In order to determine to what degree observed marriage premiums on income accrue from the 
extensive or intensive margin, i.e., from higher employment rates or more hours, staggered 
fixed effects estimates of employment are estimated for each type of marriage. Results for 
female immigrants, shown in Table 9, show some pre-marriage employment growth but little 24 
 
post marriage employment growth with the exception of female immigrants in the older age at 
migration sub-sample that marry natives. 
 
Table 9: Pre- and Post-Marriage Effects on Employment, Female Immigrants.  Staggered 
Fixed Effects Estimation Separately by Type of Marriage. 







































































































3 or more years 



























Dependent variable: employment status (0/1). Controls: age (5 categories), education (7 categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). ** denotes significance at 1% level 
and * significance at 5% level. Standard Errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the individual level in all 
estimations. 
 
Even for male immigrants, significant employment growth, relative to those that have four 
years or more to marriage, both pre- and post-marriage is noted for those that marry natives in 
the older age at migration sub-sample. Employment stabilizes at a level approximately 9 
percentage points higher at the year of marriage relative to those within this marriage type, 
that have four or more years left to marriage.  
 
After controlling for individual heterogeneity, immigrants that intra-marry with spouses from 
home countries do not indicate significant employment changes around the year of marriage. 
Significantly higher levels of income post-marriage, noted above, must therefore stem from 
changes in work hours or wages rather than changes in employment.  25 
 
 
Table 10: Pre- and Post-Marriage Effects on Employment, Male Immigrants Staggered 
Fixed Effects Estimation Separately by Type of Marriage. 







































































































3 or more years 



























Dependent variable: employment status (0/1). Controls: age (5 categories), education (7 categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). ** denotes significance at 1% level 





In this study, inter- and intra-marriage premiums are analyzed using panel data for the years 
1998-2005. The sample used in estimation consists of two subsets of immigrants in Sweden, 
based on age at immigration, who have a first registered change in civil status from single to 
married during the observation period. Three marriage types are defined, intra-marriage to 
spouses from the same country of origin, intra-marriage to spouses from other (non-Swedish) 
countries of origin and intermarriage to natives.  Results from fixed effects estimation indicate 
positive marriage premiums for both types of intra- and inter-marriage, with the exception of 
male immigrants that intra-marry with spouses from other (non-Swedish) countries of origin. 
Intra-marriage premiums associated with marriage to spouses from home countries are found 
to be of similar or significantly larger magnitude than premiums associated with intermarriage 
to natives. 26 
 
 
As selection based on unobserved time-varying characteristics, such as host language 
proficiency, may still bias estimates of marriage premiums, staggered fixed effects models of 
income, using variation in the timing of marriage, are estimated separately for each type of 
marriage. If one believes that unobservable characteristics are more similar within marriage 
types than across marriage types, this type of estimation further reduces any remaining 
selection bias on coefficient estimates.  Results indicate that there are significant increases in 
earnings prior to year of marriage for all three marriage types in comparison to those within 
respective marriage type that have four or more years to marriage. As such, there is no causal 
impact of a change in civil status per se on earnings. This result does not, however, refute that 
interactions with natives prior to intermarriage has a causal effect on earnings. A lack of post-
marriage earnings growth for those that intermarry with natives, however, does as one would 
expect earnings growth to escalate shortly after marriage when immigrants reap the benefits 
of the networks, institutional know-how, language proficiency and other factors associated 
with having a native spouse.  
 
Results presented here suggest that intra-marriage to spouses from home countries is 
associated with a stronger relative attachment to the labor market, once selection into this type 
of marriage is accounted for, as earnings do not appear to taper off post-marriage (during the 
observation period) as is found for those that intermarry with natives.  This patterns suggest 
that there may be mechanisms at work pushing immigrants to maintain a stronger relative 
attachment to the labor market in order to help more recently-arrived spouses enter the labor 
market, and is consistent with results showing smaller spousal employment gaps post-
marriage for those that intra-marry than those that intermarry.  
 27 
 
In conclusion, marriage is associated with higher income for both female and male 
immigrants in Sweden, regardless of marriage type (with one exception), once selection based 
on unobserved time invariant heterogeneity is taken into account. Significant earnings growth 
prior to the actual year of marriage combined with a lack of income growth post-marriage 
suggest that the premiums associated with intermarriage to natives found in earlier studies are, 
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Table A1: Intermarriage Rates by Country of Origin 









Finland  79.6 73.7 61.2 37.8 
Yugoslavia 
(former) 
13.2 27.5 11.5 10.7 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
6.7 8.5 8.4  10.2 
Chile  50.3 54.1 42.4 29.5 
Iraq 7.7  17.3  3.7  3.5 
Iran  28.2 27.5 24.4 13.3 
Poland  65.6 48.8 45.3 21.9 
Thailand  84.7 58.3 90.7 20.0 
      
Note: The first six groups are the largest immigrant groups in the sample. Poland and Thailand are included to 
represent two of the largest recent immigrant groups. 
 
Table A2: Description of Variables  
Variable Description 
log income  The sum of annual income from wages, 
business activities, sick leave and parental 
leave compensation. 
Employment status  Binary variable measuring employment 
status during a measurement week in 
November.  
Intra-marriage: National  Marriage to a foreign born person from same 
country of origin. 
Intra-marriage: Other Foreign Born  Marriage to a foreign born person from a 
different (non-Swedish) country of origin. 
Intermarriage: Native  Marriage to a native born. 
Age   Five age categories are defined; 18-24, 25-
29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40-65. 
Education  Six categories indicating highest completed 
level of education; compulsory school, 
secondary school, short tertiary, university, 
PhD, missing information. 
Duration of residence  No of days in the host country. 
Small children  Binary variable indicating the presence of 
small children (aged 0-3) in the household. 
Region of Origin  Eight categories defined; Nordic, West 
Europe, East Europe, North/Central America, 





Table A3: Marriage Premiums on Earnings, by Gender and Region of Origin, Age at 
Migration < 16. Fixed Effects Estimation 
  Female Immigrants: 























































Observations  20,695 4,990 18,061 2,010 11,699 40,501 4,385  314 
R-squared 0.52  0.55  0.58  0.59 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.55 
          
  Male Immigrants: 






















































Observations  23,316  6,781 15,879 1,810 9,996  27,061 3,529  378 
R-squared 0.55  0.60  0.60 0.62 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.52
          
Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: age (5 categories), education (seven categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). ** denotes significance at 1% and ** 
at 5%  level. Standard Errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the individual level in all estimations. Regions: 
Nordic, West Europe (W.E.), East Europe (E.E.), North/Central America (N./C.A.), South America (S.A.), Asia, 
Africa and Oceania (Oc.). 
 
Table A4: Marriage Premiums on Earnings, by Gender and Region of Origin, Age at 
Migration 16-45. Fixed Effects Estimation 
  Female Immigrants: 























































Observations 26,497  10,329  27,743 3,198 6,742 25,463 8,251  570
R-squared 0.56  0.59  0.54  0.57 0.55 0.56 0.60 0.57 
          
  Male Immigrants: 























































Observations  21,509  20,595  38,133 4,640 7,611  53,576 16,239 1,627 
R-squared 0.63  0.60  0.50  0.58  0.52 0.53 0.52 0.56 
          
Dependent variable: log annual earnings. Controls: age (5 categories), education (seven categories), duration of 
residence (quadratic), small children (dummy), year dummies (1998-2005). ** denotes significance at 1% and ** 
at 5%  level. Standard Errors, in parenthesis, are clustered at the individual level in all estimations. Regions: 
Nordic, West Europe (W.E.), East Europe (E.E.), North/Central America (N./C.A.), South America (S.A.), Asia, 
Africa and Oceania (Oc.). 